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1 INTRODUCTION 
Market competition has grown gradually due to con-
tinuous increase in production demand, resulting in 
the implementation of mechanized and automated 
systems which enhance targeted delivery time, qual-
ity and quantity of supply. The automation of opera-
tional processes and equipment mechanization force 
the development of maintenance functions and con-
trol in order to manage system failure uncertainty. 
The business effectiveness and efficiency are in-
fluenced by factors such as time, economic factors, 
technology and innovation, quality, reliability and in-
formation management (Madu, 2000). With the inten-
tion of competing successfully, companies strive to 
enhance their inspection and maintenance systems, 
ZKLFKQHHGWREHFRQVLGHUHGGXULQJWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
strategic planning. In this respect, several definitions 
are provided for maintenance by various authors sum-
marizing the notion that maintenance is a set of tech-
nical, administrative and managerial actions targeting 
to retain or restore the state of a system to function as 
required (Mobley et al., 2008). Nowadays, mainte-
nance is encountered as an operational method, which 
is employed as a profit generating process and a cost 
reduction budget center through an enhanced Opera-
tion and Maintenance (O&M) strategy. 
Hence, this paper aims to present the development 
of the Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) methodology 
as suggested by INCASS (Inspection Capabilities for 
Enhanced Ship Safety) FP7 EU funded project. First 
RIDOO6HFWLRQLQWURGXFHVWKHSDSHU¶VVFRSHDQGPR
tivation of research. Section 2 refers to the research 
background which involves the exploration of Condi-
tion Based Maintenance (CBM) methodology and 
well known Condition Monitoring (CM) technologies 
and tools. In Section 3 the suggested Machinery Risk 
Analysis (MRA) methodology is presented. Section 4 
demonstrates MRA by presenting a review on the lat-
est reliability tools, the advantages of time dependent 
reliability modelling as well as two case studies for 
the Turbocharger (T/C) and cargo pump system. Sec-
tion 5 presents the results of the case studies whereas, 
Section 6 concludes with the discussions and future 
work for the MRA development. 
2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Automated maintenance methodologies are devel-
oped aiming to achieve higher level of reliability by 
reducing operational costs and risk of damage due to 
human error. A literature review by Dhillon and Liu 
(2006) highlights that a large amount of human errors 
take place during maintenance operations. 
As equipment onboard ships becomes more com-
plex and the shipping market more competitive, the 
need for automated maintenance management sys-
tems is present, which should be enhanced by com-
puterized, flexible tools for managing critical assets. 
According to Shreve (2003), these systems suggest 
maintenance planning as they assist with critical data 
for equipment, workforce and recorded conditions. 
Thus, the need for computerized maintenance meth-
odologies appears, which tends to minimize unneces-
VDU\KXPDQ¶V LQYROYHPHQWGXULQJDFFHSWDEOHRSHUD
tional machinery conditions. The latest and widely 
applicable maintenance methodology is known as 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). 
The scope of CBM and fault diagnosis, as defined 
by Mechefske (2005), is to detect the upcoming fail-
uresDLPLQJWRHQKDQFHPDFKLQHU\¶VUHOLDELOLty, effi-
ciency and safety, reducing maintenance costs 
through controlled spare part inventories. In this case, 
Condition Monitoring (CM) technology is applied 
through various tools by recording and evaluating 
measurable parameters that will be reviewed in this 
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section. The most known CM technologies are 
grouped among vibration, noise, thermography and 
oil analysis monitoring, which are presented next. 
2.1 Vibration Monitoring 
Vibration measurement is a key element in predictive 
maintenance. According to Al-Najjar (1996), the im-
plementation of vibration-based maintenance offers 
early indications of machinery malfunctions by in-
volving parameters such as rotational speed, loading 
frequency, environmental conditions and material 
state. The most common faults detectable by vibra-
tion monitoring are unbalance of rotating machine 
parts, shaft misalignment, damaged gear teeth, excess 
sleeve bearing wear, excessive gaps, and problems in 
the rotor and stator of electrical engines (Monition, 
2014). 
2.2 Acoustic and Ultrasonic Monitoring 
One of the first symptoms of mechanical or electrical 
faults is the increase of noise generated by machinery 
parts. Most parts emit consistent sound patterns under 
normal operating conditions. These sonic signatures 
can be defined and recognized, while changes in these 
signatures can be also identified as components begin 
to wear or deteriorate. When a leak is present in a sys-
tem, an increase of the ultrasound measurement is ob-
served. The ultrasonic detector produces an alarm 
when there is a deviation from the normal level of 
background noise (INCASS, 2014). 
Ultrasonic detection is fast and cost efficient com-
pared to temperature, vibration and oil analysis as it 
does not require sensor installation on the specified 
components that are monitored (Kim and Lee, 2009). 
The importance of ultrasonic CM is also suggested by 
IACS as presented Unified Requirements and Proce-
dural Requirements for Ultrasonic Thickness Meas-
urements (UTM) (IACS, 2004). Some of the sources 
of acoustic emissions in metals are material cracks, 
plastic deformation development and fracturing. 
2.3 Thermography 
Thermography measures the temperature of machin-
ery to detect changes in operation by indicating fault 
development. Therefore, Bagavathiappan et al. 
(2013) support that Infrared Thermography (IRT) is 
one of the most accepted CM tools due to the non-
contact function. The key advantage of IRT compared 
to other CM tools is the real-time representation of 
pseudo-color coded image. Higher temperature is 
generated either by friction, bad contact or excessive 
wear, thus causing overheating or hot spots. 
2.4 Oil Analysis/Tribology 
Oil analysis is achieved through laboratory concen-
tration analysis in lubricant which deals with shape, 
size, composition of wear particles and degradation 
analysis for physical and chemical characteristics 
(Jiang and Yan, 2008). Oil analysis does not only al-
low to obtain information about the operating condi-
tions, wear and contamination levels and equipment 
lifespan, but also enables the set-up of a CBM lubri-
cating program. The parameters measured in order to 
perform oil analysis are summarized as kinematic vis-
cosity, content of water, lube oil acid number, particle 
count, detection of insoluble and emission spectrom-
etry, and ferrography studies. 
2.5 Data Acquisition Tool Options 
This part of research discusses the necessity and ap-
plicability of monitoring by presenting available sen-
sor options. Various sensors and devices are available 
in the market and their specifications have to be ex-
plored. As part of INCASS project, the machinery 
condition is assessed on a real-time continuous basis 
onboard ship. In order to achieve this, sensors are in-
stalled for data collection. The gathered data is used 
within the MRA methodology. Hence, it is essential 
to identify and classify the sensor types for each of 
the already presented CM technologies. The VHQVRUV¶
characteristics are specified in terms of the output rec-
ord DVZHOODVGHYLFHV¶VHQVLWLYLW\DFFXUDF\RQVSH
cific operational conditions (i.e. temperature range) 
and their cost. 
The most applicable CM tool is the vibration anal-
ysis. The vibration sensors are categorized among 
displacement, velocity and acceleration. Each type 
denotes the output record. However, for particular 
monitoring cases, high temperature piezoelectric and 
triaxial sensors are introduced in the market. 
On the other hand, noise monitoring and thermal 
imaging consist of simpler sensor ranges compared to 
vibration monitoring. Thermal imaging involves ther-
mal cameras and thermometers. On the other hand, 
acoustic emissions are recorded using ultrasonic 
hand-held equipment or online installed ultrasonic 
sensors and portable decibel meters. 
3 SUGGESTED MRA METHODOLOGY 
INCASS Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) method-
ology is developed in order to be applied on three dif-
ferent ship types such as tanker, bulk carrier and con-
tainer ship. Hence, the MRA methodology is flexible 
in order to fulfill all requirements and specifications 
for each ship type. In this section, the MRA method-
ology is presented by demonstrating the input data 
flow and MRA process diagram. 
The graphical demonstration of machinery and 
equipment modelling and analysis data flow is dis-
played in Figure 1. It consists of three stages, the data 
acquisition and processing, the reliability model and 
the Decision Support System (DSS). The INCASS 
MRA is developed in Java Object Oriented Program-
ming (OOP) language, whereas the DSS development 
takes place in R programming language.
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Figure 1. Machinery & equipment modelling & analysis data flow. 
3.1 Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) Methodology 
Firstly, the MRA methodology includes the gath-
ering of data in order to process them. Data are cate-
gorized among historical, expert and real time moni-
toring. Raw data (unprocessed information collected 
from experts and onboard sensors), are transformed 
to data input for the MRA methodology. The col-
lected data is classified by component, sub-system 
and main system levels. 
All gained information is stored in the database 
utilizing text (.txt) files. This format file is selected as 
files are small in size and can be easily transferred 
from the onboard to the onshore. The following phase 
involves the real monitoring signal processing. At this 
phase, signals are filtered and unnecessary infor-
mation gathered from the environment of operation is 
removed. The following critical phase is the transfor-
mation of physical sensorial measurements to relia-
bility inputs. 
,Q6WDJHµ5HOLDELOLW\0RGHO¶WKHSURFHVVHGUHOL
ability input data from the database are introduced. 
The risk and reliability model employs a network ar-
rangement similar to the BBNs. This selection allows 
the probabilistic and mathematical modelling by con-
sidering actual functional relations and system/sub-
system/component interdependencies. 
The third stage of the INCASS model implements 
Decision Support System (DSS) aspects. The DSS 
methodology is divided into two sections. The first 
one is utilized for local (onboard) and short term de-
cision making, whereas the second one is used on-
shore (global) for longer term predictions and deci-
sion features. 
The INCASS methodology so far demonstrates the 
procedures on the data flow level. Hence, it presents 
the analysis from an input manipulation perspective. 
In the following figure (Figure 2), the analysis takes 
place on the specific MRA process and modelling 
level. 
First principles analysis 
RIWKHSDUWV¶UHOLDELOLW\
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Figure 2. Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) process diagram. 
 
As can be seen, INCASS project introduces two main 
tools the MRA and DSS. On the data flow level, the 
description incorporates data handling from the data 
gathering phase up to decision making. On the other 
hand, MRA involves the risk and reliability analysis 
and processes. At the process level, various methods 
are employed for the condition and failure diagnostics 
as well as signal pattern recognition of the received 
and pre-processed data input. The filtered/processed 
data is transformed into component reliability inputs 
such as failure rates (Ȝ), Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) and Probability of Failure (PoF). 
Lastly, the INCASS MRA model aims to predict 
the future condition of the under investigation ship 
machinery and equipment. This prognostic feature 
tends to forecast the failure occurrence (failure modes 
and events), the time that this failure will take place 
as well as the components, sub-systems and systems 
that will be affected. 
3.2 Reliability Modelling Tools Review 
Various reliability modelling tools are reviewed such 
as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analy-
sis (ETA) and Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) in 
order to select the appropriate for the INCASS MRA 
modelling requirements. Furthermore in this section, 
the advantages of time dependent probabilistic relia-
bility modelling are demonstrated. 
 The most known and well applied reliability mod-
elling tools include the FTA, ETA, BBN and their dy-
namic models of DFTA and DBN respectively. Each 
of these tools has advantages and limitations, which 
allow different modelling flexibility levels and selec-
tion of failure case scenarios. Furthermore, dynamic 
modelling introduces reliability time dependencies by 
simulating failure rates or PoF in various discrete 
time slices. 
According to Bedford and Cooke (2001), FTA is a 
modelling tool employed as part of quantitative anal-
ysis of systems. It is basic tool in system analysis, 
which allows pictorial representation of statement in 
Boolean logic (i.e. 0 or 1, yes or no etc.). FTA devel-
ops a deterministic description of the occurrence of 
an event (the top event). Fault trees analyze the com-
ponent failure which contributes to system failure. 
Furthermore, FTA most usually employs the Boolean 
operations and, or and not (Kumamoto and Henley, 
1996). 
A typical fault tree arrangement is developed from 
top to bottom, while calculations of the failure case 
scenarios are generated from the bottom basic events 
determining the failure of the top event. The sequence 
of events is built by logic gates (Lazakis et al., 2010). 
In the case of Dynamic FTA (DFTA), the Probability 
of Working (PoW) is updated continuously by chang-
ing condition and value through time. In other words, 
time dependencies of the operational conditions are 
introduced. Hence, the dynamic risk modelling of 
FTA employs the dynamic logic gates. 
,Q FRQWUDVW ZLWK )7$ (7$ XWLOL]HV µIRUZDUG
ORJLF¶+HQFHLWEHJLQVZLWKDQLQLWLDWLQJHYHQWLH
non-standard functional case) and propagate this 
event through the system by considering all possible 
routes/options that can affect the behavior of the sys-
tem (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). 
The third and most critical under consideration 
quantitative risk tool is the BBN. The main advantage 
of this tool is the flexible arrangement of the involved 
systems/sub-systems/components and failure modes 
(Taheri et al., 2014). 
Network arrangement allows the innovative notion 
of interconnectivities between systems/sub-sys-
tems/components. In other words, networks present 
the interdependency of units. On the other hand, BBN 
introduces the functions of cost and decision by em-
ploying utility nodes (Dikis et al., 2014). 
An example of a BBN model is presented in Figure 
3 for a diesel Main Engine (M/E). This model demon-
strates an extract of the reliability tool developed for 
the INCASS MRA. The system/sub-systems/compo-
nents and the Failure Modes (FMs) are presented in 
µQRGHV¶while they demonstrate the input gates that 
the reliability data will be inserted. The arrows pre-
sent the connections between the FMs and the com-
ponents/sub-systems and main system. 
 
 
Figure 3. Bayesian Belief Network arrangement. 
 
The BBNs can be defined as probabilistic graphical 
models involving conditional dependencies arranged 
into Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) and the func-
tional relations are mathematically expressed as pre-
sented in Equation 1. 
 ܲሺܣȁܤሻ ൌ ܲሺܤȁܣሻ כ ܲሺܣሻܲሺܤሻ  (1) 
Where P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of events 
A and B, while A given B and B given A are condi-
WLRQDO SUREDELOLWLHV (TXDWLRQ  LV NQRZQ DV %D\HV¶
Theorem. 
Therefore, network modelling tool is employed in 
INCASS MRA methodology. The reasons for this se-
lection are oriented towards the advantages in terms 
of modelling flexibility, interconnectivity of system, 
sub-system and component levels as well as interde-
pendency of failure modes and implementation of 
cost and decision utility nodes. 
3.3 MRA Reliability Modelling 
In the case of dynamic modelling, the time dependen-
cies and state division of the reliability input are de-
veloped in parallel with the network model. The 
MRA application employs the mathematical tool of 
Markov Chains (MC) (Fort et al., 2015). MC is math-
ematical system that undergoes transitions from one 
state to another on a state space. Furthermore, MC is 
selected as it is flexible to set up by allowing different 
levels of state sequence complexity. 
In order to understand the dynamic probabilistic 
modelling, a schematic diagram is presented in Figure 
4. The presented sub-system sample includes in total 
three states within the timeline. Firstly, historical pro-
cessed data from the previous time slice are provided 
shown as t-1. The current state (t) is calculated, 
whereas the predictive state is shown as future state 
t+1. As it can be seen in Figure 4, each time slice (t-
1, t, t+1) is based on the previous state. This single 
state transition from past to present and then to fore-
casted future is known as Markov Chain (MC). The 
generic probabilistic expression is shown in Equation 
2. On the other hand, Equation 3 presents the PoW 
per expressed component/sub-system in the future 
t+1 time slice. Where, P(wt+1) denotes the PoW in fu-
ture state (t+1) by taking into account previous work-
ing and failing states P(wt) and P(ft) respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Dynamic probabilistic network arrangement. 
 ܲ௑ሺ௡ିଵሻǡ௑ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ܲሼܺ௧೙ ൌ ܺ௡ȁܺ௧೙షభ ൌ ܺ௡ିଵሽ (2) ܲሺݓ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܲሺݓȁݓ௧ሻܲሺݓ௧ሻ ൅ ܲሺݓȁ ௧݂ሻܲሺ ௧݂) (3) 
While, each component of a sub-system is linked with 
a certain number of failure modes that varies between 
components, a generic form expressing the failure 
case scenarios is presented in Equation 7. In this ex-
pression, P denotes the Probability of Survival (PoS) 
for different failure scenarios, where w shows the 
PoW state while f shows the PoF. The relation of w 
and f is shown in in Equation 8. Whereas, ftfn indi-
cates the failure mode (i.e. noise, vibration, overheat-
ing etc.). 
Specifically, P1 denotes the PoW and PoF states while 
one failure mode takes place (ftf1) (Equation 4). Ac-
cordingly, P2 denotes the PoW state for a different 
failure mode (ftf2) (Equation 5). Whereas, P3 repre-
sents the PoW and PoF states while ftf1 and ftf2 take 
place at the same time (Equation 6). 
ଵܲ ൌ ൜ݓǣ ? ? ?െ  ݂ݐ௙ଵ݂ǣ݂ݐ௙ଵǢ (4) 
ଶܲ ൌ ൜ݓǣ ? ? ?െ  ݂ݐ௙ଶ݂ǣ݂ݐ௙ଶǢ (5) 
ଷܲ ൌ ቊݓǣ ? ? ?െ ሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶሻ݂ǣሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶሻǢ (6) ௠ܲ ൌ ሺ݂ݐ௙ଵ כ ݂ݐ௙ଶ כ  ݂ݐ௙ଷ כ ǥ כ݂ݐ௙௞ሻ (7) ݂ ൌ  ? ? ?െ ݓ (8) 
4 MRA APPRLICATION 
In this section, two MRA case studies are presented 
by involving different ship machinery and equipment 
systems such as the Turbocharger (T/C) and cargo 
pump. The case studies examine the working state re-
liability performance on system, sub-system and 
component levels by involving various failure modes 
as well as failure case scenarios. Furthermore, the 
case studies utilize processed data in the form of fail-
XUHUDWHVȜSHUFRPSRQHQW7KHLQSXWGDWDLVVRXUFHG
from OREDA database and the entire programmed al-
gorithm is developed in Java Object Oriented Pro-
gramming (OOP) language. 
4.1 Case Study 1 
This case study involves the reliability performance 
of the Turbocharger (T/C). This system is divided in 
four sub-systems such as the expander and re-com-
pressor turbine, control and monitoring, lubrication 
and the shaft and seal. Each of these sub-systems con-
sists of multiple, related in function, components. An 
extract of these sub-systems is shown in Figure 5, 
where the control and monitoring and the shaft and 
seal sub-systems are demonstrated as well as the rel-
evant components and involved failure modes. 
 
Figure 5. Turbocharger MRA network case study. 
 
Each of the failure modes is linked with at least one 
of the selected components and the latter ones belong 
in different sub-systems (i.e. expander and re-com-
pressor turbine, control and monitoring, lubrication 
and the shaft and seal). Table 1 lists the turbocharger 
components. 
 
Table 1. Turbocharger component list. 
Turbocharger Component List  
Actuator 
Control Unit 
Flow Instrument 
General Instrument 
Monitoring 
Seal  
Subunit  
Valves  
Vibration Instrument 
 
Additionally, Table 2 presents the failure mode selec-
tion for the MRA Turbocharger case study. 
 
Table 2. Failure mode selection for MRA T/C case 
study. 
Failure Mode Abbreviation Meaning 
AIR - Abnormal Instrument Reading 
ERO - Erratic Output 
ELP - External Leakage ± Process Medium (i.e. oil, gas, con-
densate, water) 
ELU - External Leakage ± Utility Medium (i.e. lubricant, 
cooling water) 
FTS - Fail To Start on demand 
SER - Minor in-service problems 
UST - Spurious Stop 
VIB - Vibration 
 
Hence, in the T/C study a total of four sub-systems, 
sixteen components and eight failure modes are in-
volved. 
4.2 Case Study 2 
The second case study involves a critical system of 
tanker ships; that is the cargo pump system. Tanker 
ships are equipped with multiple cargo pumps (2-3 
pumps). For the purpose of this paper, the case study 
will be presented for one of them while the modelling 
is similar for all cargo pumps. For this system, eleven 
failure modes and five sub-systems such as the con-
troller, shell, cooling, couplers, and mechanical 
power are considered. Moreover, these sub-systems 
include sixteen components. The degradation predic-
tions take place on system, sub-system and compo-
nent level. Figure 6 demonstrates an extract of the 
cargo pump network. It presents the controller and 
mechanical power sub-systems as well as their in-
volved components and failure modes. 
 
Figure 6. Cargo pump MRA network case study. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the case study cargo pump com-
ponent list. 
 
Table 3. Cargo pump component list. 
Cargo Pump Component List  
Actuator 
Bearing 
Cabling 
Control Unit  
Impeller  
Monitoring  
Radial Bearing  
Shaft  
Thrust Bearing 
 
Lastly, Table 4 lists the cargo pump failure modes as 
involved in this case study. 
 
Table 4. Failure mode selection for MRA Cargo 
pump case study. 
Failure Mode Abbreviation Meaning 
AIR - Abnormal Instrument Reading 
BRD - Breakdown 
ELU - External Leakage ± Utility Medium (i.e. lubricant, 
cooling water) 
ERO - Erratic Output 
FTS - Fail To Start on demand 
NOI - Noise 
OHE - Overheating 
SER - Minor in-service problems 
STD - Structural Deficiency 
VIB - Vibration 
 
5 RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the two case stud-
ies. The outcomes are demonstrated on component, 
sub-system and system level while different failure 
modes are considered including the combination of 
various failure case scenarios. At present, the time 
slices for both case studies are considered as unitless 
values. This is due to the fact that INCASS MRA case 
studies currently employ processed data from exter-
nal sources (e.g. OREDA database) in which the time 
steps are unknown. Because the processed data is pro-
vided in observed failure rates per 106 operational 
hours, the time intervals of the predicted states cannot 
be specified, hence the results are demonstrated as 
unitless. Whereas, the final MRA application per-
forms by employing real time monitored data that 
their record interval will be known. Hence, when 
these real time monitored data are applied within the 
MRA, the time slices will gain actual unit in time as 
required (i.e. per second, minute, week, month etc.). 
5.1 Case Study 1 Results 
An extract of the Turbocharger (T/C) case study is 
demonstrated in Figure 7. The results provide the 
working state reliability performance for the main 
system (T/C), two sub-systems (i.e. control monitor-
ing and shaft and seal) and the actuator component. 
7KHDFWXDWRU¶VGHJUDGDWLRQLVH[DPLQHGWKURXJKWKUHH
failure case scenarios. Firstly, the actuator reliability 
performance is shown in case AIR failure mode takes 
place. Furthermore, the results of the second and third 
failure case scenarios are presented including the ac-
tuator ERO failure mode as well as the combination 
of the AIR and ERO failure modes. 
 
 
Figure 7. T/C reliability performance at system/sub-sys-
tem/component levels. 
 
The case study performs reliability assessment on 
system, sub-system and component levels. The mini-
mum reliability performance was recorded for the 
seal component at 83.8%, while the maximum relia-
bility at 99.99% for various components. The results 
show acceptable reliability levels. However, the fol-
lowing research phase involves the specification of 
warning levels and identification of the lowest ac-
ceptable reliability outcomes. 
5.2 Case Study 2 Results 
Similarly, an extract of the cargo pump case study is 
presented in Figure 8. The outcomes demonstrate the 
working state reliability performance for the main 
system, sub-systems (i.e. controller and mechanical 
power) and the bearing component. 7KHEHDULQJ¶VUH
liability performance is assessed through three failure 
case scenarios. Firstly, the probability of FTS taking 
place is examined, followed by the case of NOI oc-
currence. Lastly, the probability of both failure modes 
happening is presented. 
 
 
Figure 8. Cargo pump reliability performance at system/sub-sys-
tem/component levels. 
6 DISCUSSION 
The developed INCASS MRA methodology is ap-
plied on two case studies. The Turbocharger (T/C) 
and the cargo pump system are involved. Each system 
is divided into sub-systems and components. Moreo-
ver, the components are linked with failure modes 
that can be affected and lead to failure. The results of 
these case studies develop various failure case scenar-
ios by involving all components, sub-systems, failure 
modes. 
The presented outcomes show the working state 
reliability performance in five predicted time slices. 
The prediction of the condition takes place on a sys-
tem, sub-system and component level by involving a 
number of failure case scenarios. The time intervals 
are considered as unitless. The reason of this assump-
tion is that currently INCASS MRA case studies em-
ploy processed data from external sources for which 
the time steps are unknown. However, because MRA 
will employ real time monitored data, the time slices 
will gain actual unit in time as required (i.e. per sec-
ond, minute, week, month etc.). 
The T/C case study presents the working state re-
liability performance of on system level as well as the 
control monitoring and shaft seal sub-systems. Fur-
thermore, the reliability performance of the actuators 
is shown including the AIR, ERO and combination of 
both failure modes. On the other hand, the cargo 
pump case study examines the reliability performance 
on system level, controller and mechanical power 
sub-systems. Moreover, the performance of the bear-
ing is presented including the FTS, NOI and both fail-
ure modes occurring at the same time. 
In conclusion, the 05$¶V results are validated in 
different stages. Firstly, two commercial software are 
used such as GeNIe 2.0 and Hugin. Moreover, experts 
such as Classification Societies, ship owners/ opera-
tors/ managers and service providers confirmed the 
acceptable levels of the performed results. In addi-
tion, experts verified the system network arrangement 
and the failure mode selection. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aims to present the development of IN-
CASS (Inspection Capabilities for Enhanced Ship 
Safety) Machinery Risk Analysis (MRA) methodol-
ogy. First of all, the paper reviews the most applicable 
CM tools aiming to select the required for the MRA. 
The suggested MRA methodology is presented on 
data and process levels. Lastly, two case studies are 
demonstrated for the T/C and the cargo pump by pre-
senting the dynamic (time dependent) working state 
reliability performance at system, sub-system and 
component level by involving various failure modes 
and failure case scenarios. 
Concluding, future research steps include the im-
plementation of warning and alarm/risk threshold to 
be set, in order to gain practical information of the re-
liability predictions. Moreover, different MC orders 
will be tested on MRA aiming to gain longer accurate 
predictions through time. 
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